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TAKING THE "ALTERNATIVE" OUT OF THE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION OF TITLE VII CLAIMS: THE
IMPLICATIONS OF A MANDATORY ENFORCEMENT
SCHEME OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
ARISING OUT OF EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS
I. INTRODUCTION
"Mary" is a 35-year-old woman who has worked at "Firm X" for
seven years.' When Mary signed the arbitration 2 agreement contained in
her employment contract with Firm X, she never dreamed that Firm X
would deny her promotions because of her gender. Furthermore, Mary
never dreamed that by signing this employment contract, she would be
precluded from pursuing her claim of employment discrimination in a
court of law. She only knew that she needed the job and that she had to
sign the agreement as a condition of employment with Firm X. Later,
when Mary tried to bring an employment discrimination claim against
Firm X, the court informed her that she must arbitrate the claim instead.
This hypothetical situation might occur if the courts enforce agreements
to arbitrate contained in contracts of employment. The current atmos-
phere in the United States seems ripe for just such a decision.
In recent years Congress has increasingly recognized and approved
the use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) techniques to aid in
relieving the congestion and backlog in the federal courts.3 The United
States Supreme Court has recognized the emerging importance of ADR
techniques by its efforts to enforce arbitration agreements.4
In 1985, the Supreme Court began what was to be a trilogy of cases
which recognized a presumption of arbitrability5 for commercial con-
1. This scenario is a hypothetical situation created for the purposes of this Note.
2. Arbitration is a method of dispute resolution in which the parties voluntarily submit their
dispute to an impartial judge of their choice and agree in advance that the decision will be final and
binding upon them. See FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA A. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKs 2 (4th ed.
1985).
3. See 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(6) (Supp. IV 1992) (authorizing federal courts "to refer appropriate
cases to alternative dispute resolution programs"); The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166,
§ 118, 105 Stat. 1071, 1081 (1991) (endorsing the use of alternative means of dispute resolution when
appropriate).
4. For example, in 1984 the United States Supreme Court held that a California law was invalid
because it undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements covered by the Federal Arbitration
Act, which creates a presumption of enforceability of certain arbitration agreements. Southland
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2). The Court stated that Congress did not
intend for the Arbitration Act to be limited to those disputes brought in federal court, but that it
would also be applicable in state courts. Id. at 15-16. Finally, the Supreme Court held that the
California law in question violated the Supremacy Clause of Article Six of the United States
Constitution because it undermined the Federal Arbitration Act's presumption of enforceability of
arbitration agreements. Id. at 16.
5. This presumption basically means that there is a national policy favoring an arbitral forum
over a judicial forum when an agreement to arbitrate a dispute has been signed. Southland Corp.,
465 U.S. at 10.
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tracts.6 The first case in this trilogy, Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth,7 involved claims arising under the Sherman Act and arose in
an international commercial context.8 Citing strong policy reasons favor-
ing international relations in the business community, the Court enforced
an agreement to arbitrate certain anti-trust claims.9
Two years later, in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,10
the Supreme Court enforced agreements to arbitrate claims arising under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and claims arising under the Racket-
eer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO)."' Finally, in Rod-
riguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,12 the Court held
that predispute agreements made pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933
were arbitrable even though the Act contained a nonwaiver provision.' 3
In this Mitsubishi trilogy, the Court began to find statutory claims
arbitrable.
The most recent decision raising a presumption of arbitrability, Gil-
mer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,14 extended the mandatory enforce-
ment of arbitration agreements into the realm of employment
discrimination suits.' 5 At issue in Gilmer was the arbitrability of claims
arising under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(ADEA).' In Gilmer, Gilmer, a securities representative, registered with
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), as was required by his employer,
Interstate.' 7 The registration application required that Gilmer "agree to
arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy" that arose between himself
and Interstate.' In 1987, when Gilmer was 62 years old, Interstate fired
him. 9 Gilmer then brought an ADEA suit.20 Interstate, however, filed a
motion in federal court to compel arbitration of the ADEA claim.2'
Interstate's motion relied on the arbitration agreement Gilmer signed
with his registration application and the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).22
6. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
7. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
8. Id. at 616. It is from Mitsubishi that this series of cases became titled the Mitsubishi trilogy.
9. Id. at 638-40 (citing to the international policy of favoring arbitration).
10. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
11. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
12. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
13. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (overruling
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953)).
14. 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991).
15. Gilmer v. Interstate/johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647, 1657 (1991).
16. Id. at 1650 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-633a (1988) [hereinafter the ADEA]).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1651.
20. Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1651 (suing after filing a charge with the EEOC).
21. Id.
22. Id.; 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1988) [hereinafter the FAA]. The FAA began as the Act of February
12, 1925, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883. Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1651. It was codified as Title 9 in 1947. Id. The
Court in Gilmer relied on the FAA's enforcement provision which states that "a contract evidencing a
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This arbitration agreement required Gilmer to arbitrate disputes arising
out of his employment with Interstate.23 The court of appeals enforced
the arbitration agreement, holding that Gilmer must arbitrate his claim
pursuant to the agreement, and the Supreme Court affirmed.24
Although commentators have applauded Gilmer for its apparent
endorsement of ADR techniques,25 Gilmer has its critics.26  Many aca-
demics speculated about the degree to which this trend of enforcing arbi-
tration clauses, signed in agreements ancillary to employment contracts,
will impoverish the congressionally-created protections against employ-
ment discrimination, such as the ADEA and the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act.27
This Note is concerned with individuals who seek to vindicate their
rights protecting them against employment discrimination under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).' This Note will first address
the history of the Supreme Court's treatment of Title VII arbitration.29 It
will then examine how Gilmer, decided in the context of the Age Discrim-
ination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), might affect the arbitration
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such
contract or transaction... shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
23. Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1650.
24. Id. at 1657.
25. 137 CONG. REc. S15478 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Sen. Dole).
26. See generally Christine Godsil Cooper, Where Are We Going With Gilmer?--Some
Ruminations on the Arbitration of Discrimination Claims, 11 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REV. 203 (1992)
(offering a thorough analysis and thoughtful criticism of the Gilmer decision); see also Michael G.
Holcomb, Note, The Demise of the FAA'S "Contract of Employment" Exception? Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 1992 J. Disp. RESOL. 213 (offering readers a quick overview of Gilmer
and discussing the Gilmer dissent which highlights the majority's flawed manner of skirting the issue
of the FAA's coverage, or lack of coverage, of employment contracts).
27. See generally Wendy S. Tien, Note, Compulsory Arbitration of ADA Claims: Disabling the
Disabled, 77 MINN. L. REv. 1443 (1993) (dealing with the ramifications of Gilmer on the Americans
with Disabilities Act); see also Jennifer A. Clifton, Note, The Right to Sue v. The Agreement to
Arbitrate: The Dilemma in Title VII Cases, 1991 J. Disp. RESOL. 407, 415 (articulating the effect that
Gilmer had on Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 905 F. 2d 104 (5th Cir. 1990), vacated, 111 S.
Ct. 2050 (1991), rev'd, 939 F. 2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991)).
28. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988)
[hereinafter Title VII]. Title VII provides that:
[iut shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id. at § 2000e-2 (emphasis added).
This repeated use of the word "individual" in the language of Title VII suggests that Congress
was particularly aware of individual litigants in Title VII actions and the importance of vindicating the
rights of these individuals.
29. See infra notes 34-49 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's historical
treatment of the arbitration of Title VII).
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of Title VII claims. 30 This Note will then consider the direction that fed-
eral courts should take with respect to the arbitration of Title VII claims
in the future, and will discuss the exclusion of employment contracts from
coverage by the FAA and the reason this exclusion is mandated.31 Next, it
will attempt to distinguish Title VII from the ADEA.32 This Note con-
cludes with the affirmation that Title VII claims should only be arbitrated
3when it is a truly voluntary process.
II. ARBITRATION OF TITLE VII CLAIMS
A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW THROUGH GILMER
The seminal case dealing with arbitration of Title VII claims is Alex-
ander v. Gardner-Denver Co.'4 In Gardner-Denver, the United States
Supreme Court held that an employee was entitled to trial de novo for the
denial of his statutory rights under Title VII, despite the fact that he had
already pursued the matter under the grievance-arbitration clause of his
collective bargaining agreement.3 The Gardner-Denver decision empha-
sized the importance the Supreme Court placed on the ability of Title VII
claimants to litigate their employment discrimination claim. Although the
Gilmer Court discounted many of the premises on which Gardner-Den-
ver was based, 6 it did not expressly overrule Gardner-Denver.37 Now,
30. See infra notes 50-66 and accompanying text (discussing the current status of the law
governing the arbitration of Tide VII disputes).
31. See infra notes 67-138 and accompanying text (discussing the future of the arbitration of
Title VII claims and the FAA's employment contract exception).
32. See infra notes 139-164 and accompanying text (distinguishing Title VII from the ADEA).
33. See infra notes 165-167 and accompanying text (discussing when the arbitration of Title VII
claims would be appropriate).
34. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
35. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 59-60 (1974) (allowing an employee to
pursue his Title VII claims trial de novo after receiving an unfavorable arbitration award).
36. The Court in Gilmer emphasized that the Gardner-Denver Court was acting under a
"mistrust" of the arbitral process. Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1656 n. 5. The Supreme Court further noted
that this mistrust is no longer present in the Court today. Id.
It is questionable whether the Gardner-Denver Court really had such a "mistrust" for the arbitral
process, for they recognized that under the right circumstances, it could be both an "inexpensive" and
"expeditious" means for resolving employment discrimination suits. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co., 415 U.S. 36, 55 (1974). The Gardner-Denver Court also recognized that arbitration could have
therapeutic benefits for any employee by satisfying their "perceived need to resort to [a] judicial
forum." Id. The Court further stated that arbitration could offer a better way to eliminate
misunderstandings and avoid the aggravation of a lawsuit. Id.
37. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647, 1657 (1991) (distinguishing
Gardner-Denver rather than overruling it). The Gilmer Court distinguished Gardner-Denver on the
basis that Gilmer did not involve the enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate, but rather involved
the issue of "whether arbitration of contract-based claims precluded subsequent judicial resolution of
statutory claims." Id. It also noted that unlike Gilmer, Gardner-Denver was not decided under the
FAA. Id. The significance of deciding Gilmer under the FAA is that the FAA reflects a policy
favoring arbitration. Id.
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federal courts must guess which parts of Gardner-Denver that Gilmer left
intact.38
Although commercial, rather than labor, arbitration is the focus of
this Note, 39 it is nevertheless important to be familiar with Gardner Den-
ver. In Gardner-Denver, the United States Supreme Court noted that
Congress has entrusted federal courts with the responsibility of enforcing
Title VII rights.40 The Court recognized the significant role that individ-
ual employees play as "private litigant[s]" in the enforcement of Title VII
rights.4 ' These private litigants are not only redressing their own injuries
but are also vindicating "the important congressional policy against dis-
criminatory employment practices." 42  Finally, the Court stated that an
employee's rights under Title VII cannot be prospectively waived.43 Such
a waiver would prove to be a defeat of the "paramount congressional pur-
pose" on which Title VII was based. ' These premises on which the
Gardner-Denver decision are based are arguably as important in 1994 as
they were in 1974, when Gardner-Denver was decided, since the pur-
poses of Title VII have yet to be accomplished.
Until Gilmer, Gardner-Denver seemed to be the controlling law with
respect to the arbitration of Title VII claims.' Before Gilmer, Title VII
claimants could pursue their claims in the federal courts under Gardner-
38. See infra notes 40-44 and accompanying text (discussing the Gardner-Denver decision). It is
likely that all of Gardner-Denver remains intact when an agreement to arbitrate made pursuant to a
collective-bargaining agreement is at issue. See Gilmer, 1II S. Ct. at 1656-57 (distinguishing the
collective-bargaining agreement from individual statutory rights). See also Cooper, supra note 26, at
236 (posing the question of whether collective-bargaining agreements are within the reach of the
FAA). The question of whether collective bargaining agreements are within the reach of the FAA is
left unanswered by Gilmer and is beyond the scope of this Note since this Note's concern is with
Gilmer's implications on individual employment contracts. However, readers interested in this topic
may want to see a recent case involving an arbitration provision signed in a collective-bargaining
agreement which applied Gardner-Denver and held that the plaintiff was not precluded from
pursuing her Title VII claim in a judicial forum. Tarrant v. United Parcel Service, Inc., No. 93 C
5660, 1994 WL 30552, at *3 (N.D.Ill. Feb. 3, 1994).
39. In commercial arbitration, the plaintiffs themselves have usually signed a contract to
arbitrate their disputes, whereas in labor arbitration "the union has negotiated and signed the
arbitration clause on behalf of its members." C. Richard Shell, ERISA and Other Federal
Employment Statutes: When is Commercial Arbitration an "Adequate Substitute"for the Courts?, 68
TEX. L. REv. 509, 531 (1990). In commercial arbitration, the individual decides whether or not to
proceed with a claim, and the individual is responsible for representing his or her own interests or
iring an attorney to do so. Id. In labor arbitration, the union has the responsibility of representing
the interests of the aggrieved party in any manner that the union sees fit. Id.
40. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 36. The Court in Gardner-Denver stated that "[t]he purpose
and procedures of Title VII indicate that Congress intended federal courts to exercise T'nal
responsibility for enforcement of Title VII" and concluded that, in light of such a goal, it would be
inconsistent for a court to defer to an arbitral decision. Id. at 56. The Court also stated that the right
to enforce Title VII is "vested" with the federal courts. Id. at 44.
41. Id. at 45.
42. id.
43. Id. at 51.
44. Id. The Court stated that it was Congress's purpose "that each employee be free from
discriminatory practices." Id.
45. See infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text (discussing how the federal courts were
deciding cases of arbitration agreements when Title VII claims were at stake before Gilmer).
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Denver, even though they had signed compulsory arbitration agree-
ments.46 As late as 1990, federal circuit courts relied on Gardner-Denver
as authority for allowing those who had signed compulsory arbitration
agreements to pursue their claims in federal courts.47 The Court made
these decisions in spite of the Mitsubishi trilogy, which seemed to create a
presumption in favor of compulsory arbitration in the commercial con-
text.48 Similarly, courts gave latitude to ADEA claimants to take their
discrimination claims to the courts despite previously signed compulsory
arbitration agreements.49 In fact, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals,
which decided Gilmer, was the only federal circuit court that strayed from
this trend of allowing discrimination claims into the federal courts,
despite previously signed arbitration agreements."° The United States
Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit's decision in Gilmer.51
Though Gilmer was decided in an ADEA context,52 at least one cir-
cuit court has extended its rationale to make the arbitration of Title VII
46. See Swenson v. Management Recruiters Int'l, Inc., 858 F. 2d 1304, 1307 (8th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 848 (1989) (concluding that in passing Title VII, Congress's intent was to assist
victims of discrimination and that arbitration might hinder this mandate); Utley v. Goldman Sachs &
Co., 883 F.2d 184, 187 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1045 (1990) (finding that Title VII does
not mandate that a claimant arbitrate prior to a judicial hearing).
47. Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 905 F. 2d 104, 108 (5th Cir. 1990), vacated, 111 S. Ct.
2050 (1991), rev'd, 939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991). In its initial decision, the Alford court relied heavily
upon Gardner-Denver. Alford, 905 F.2d at 107-08. The court recognized that just as there had been
strong federal policy favoring commercial arbitration, the same could be said about labor arbitration.
Id. at 107. The policy favoring labor arbitration failed to cause the Gardner-Denver Court to
subordinate the interests in Title VII to the policies favoring labor arbitration. Id. The court also
stated that Gardner-Denver appeared "to rest first on a construction of Title VII" rather than on its
context in a collective-bargaining situation. Id. Thus, since Alford involved a Title VII suit, the court
said Gardner-Denver was controlling rather than recent decisions favoring commercial arbitration.
Id. at 108.
48. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985);
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (making up the string of cases commonly
called the Mitsubishi trilogy which mark the turning point where the Supreme Court started to favor
commercial arbitration). But see Atchison T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557 (1987). In Buell,
decided two years after Mitsubishi and in the same ear as McMahon, the Supreme Court stated that
despite the strong policies favoring arbitration, "different considerations apply where the employee's
claim is based on rights arising out of a statute designed to provide minimum substantive guarantees
to individual workers." Id. at 565 (quoting Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, 450 U.S. 728,
737 (1981)) (emphasis added).
49. See Nicholson v. CPC Int'l Inc., 877 F. 2d 221 (3rd Cir. 1989). The Nicholson court
thoroughly analyzed why the FAA's presumption of arbitrability does not apply to the ADEA. Id. at
224-30. At issue in Nicholson was .an employeeIs prospective waiver of a judicial forum for ADEA
claims." Id. at 230. The court concluded that evidence of a contra congressional intent expressed
by the ADEA overcame the presumption of arbitrability arising under the FAA. Id.
50. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195, 203 (4th Cir. 1990), affd, 111 S. Ct.
1647 (1991) (ordering the plaintiff to arbitrate his discrimination claim). The Fourth Circuit found
the Mitsubishi trilogy to be evidence that the Supreme Court "endorsed arbitration as an effective
and efficient means of dispute resolution." Id. at 196. The Fourth Circuit held that the question of
whether an employee was maltreated because of his age was a "straightforward factual matter" that
was "within the capabilities of an arbitrator" and therefore, the FAA's presumption of arbitrability
must apply. Id. at 201.
51. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991).
52. Gilmer, 111 S. Ct at 1650 (stating that the issue in this case involves a claim brought under
the ADEA).
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claims mandatory. 53 After Gilmer, Title VII claimants who have signed
separate agreements5 4 to arbitrate disputes arising out of their employ-
ment could be required to arbitrate their Title VII claims with no chance
for relief from the courts.55 The Sixth Circuit found this to be the case in
Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.56  In Willis, the court seemed some-
what reluctant in concluding that Gilmer's rationale required it to compel
a plaintiff to arbitrate her sexual harassment and discrimination charges
with her employer.5 Gilmer, however, did not address whether the arbi-
trator's decision would actually be final and binding upon the employees
or whether the employees would have a right to trial de novo of their
statutory claim.58
Another source of current law that might provide for review of an
arbitral decision is the FAA, which lays out strict standards for review of
an arbitrator's decision.59 The FAA governs in commercial arbitration sit-
uations such as the one in which Gilmer arose.' Federal courts may
vacate an award only in situations involving fraud, corruption, or miscon-
duct by the arbitrators. 6 Still more limited are the standards for a modi-
53. See Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 905 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1990), vacated, 111 S. Ct.
2050 (1991), rev'd, 939 F. 2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1991) The Alford court originally refused to mandate
the arbitration of Title VII claims. 905 F.2d. at 107. It later reversed its decision, ordering the
enforcement of the arbitration agreement when the case was vacated by the Supreme Court in light
of its holding in Gilmer. Alford, 939 F. 2d at 229.
54. These are called "separate agreements" because these agreements are not a part of the
employee's actual employment contract. These are agreements, in addition to the actual employment
contract, that an employer requires future employees to sign before the employer will hire them. An
example of this separate agreement is the one Gilmer signed in his registration application with the
New York Stock Exchange. Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1650. Gilmer was required to sign this agreement
as a condition to his employment with Interstate. Id. The Supreme Court noted, however, that this
agreement was not a part of his actual contract of employment. Id. at 1651 n.2.
55. Id. at 1651. See also Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., .948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991).
Willis, a post-Gilmer decision, involved an arbitration agreement signed in a securities registration
application. Id. at 306. At issue was whether the agreement to arbitrate claims should be enforced
with respect to the plaintiffs Title VII claims. Id. The plaintiff alleged sexual harassment and gender
discrimination. Id. The court concluded that the rationale of Gilmer compelled the court to enforce
the agreement to arbitrate. Id. at 312.
56. 948 F. 2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991).
57. Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F. 2d 305, 312 (6th Cir. 1991) (stating that
although Gilmer forecloses a holding that would prevent Willis from arbitrating her claim, it saw no
reason for extending such a rule to agreements signed in an actual employment contract).
58. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991). If the employees had a
right to trial de novo of their statutory claim in the federal courts, Gilmer decision would be
consistent with Gardner-Denver because the Gardner-Denver Court allowed trial de novo to take
F lace after the dispute had been arbitrated. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 60
1974). The Gardner-Denver Court held that even with a trial de novo of the statutory claim, a
federal court has discretion to admit evidence of the prior arbitral decision and to afford it the weight
it finds appropriate in its consideration of the claim. Id. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court warned
federal courts to "be mindful that Congress, in enacting Title VII, thought it necessary to provide a
judicial forum for the ultimate resolution of discriminatory employment claims." Id. at 60 n.21.
59. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 10-11 (1988) (setting out the standards for a vacation or modification of an
arbitral award).
60. Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1651-52 (discussing the applicability of the FAA to the contract
involved in Gilmer).
61. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (Supp. IV 1992). A court can vacate an award:
(1) [wlhere the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means . . . [,]
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fication or correction of an arbitration award. 2 Courts will vacate awards
only when an arbitrator shows a "manifest disregard" for the law.6 This
standard provides only restricted grounds for a vacation of an award. For
example, an award would not be vacated even if it were based on an arbi-
trator's mistaken interpretation of Title VII law.6 When forced to arbi-
trate their employment discrimination claims, it is most certain that the
FAA's system of review will not allow these claimants adequate review of
their arbitral awards. This fact should prove alarming, not only for
employees arbitrating Title VII rights, but also for employers engaged in
arbitration, since arbitration is not always favorable to them."s
Thus, it seems that if the Supreme Court follows Gilmer rather than
Gardner-Denver when the arbitration of Title VII claims is at issue, these
Title VII claimants will be precluded from resorting to the courts for a
remedy.' There is still room for the Supreme Court to alter this course,
however, and give back to the Title VII claimant the choice between pur-
suing their discrimination claim in a judicial or arbitral forum.
(2) [wihere there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators[,]
(3) [w]here the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing,
upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the
controversy[,] or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have beenprejudicedf[, or]
(4) [w]here the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a
mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
Id.
62. 9 U.S.C. § 11 (1988). An arbitral award can be modified or corrected by a court:
(a) [wihere there was an evident material miscalculation of figures or an evident material
mistake in the description of any person, thing, or property referred to in the award[,]
(b) [wihere the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them, unless it
is a matter not affecting the merits of the decision upon the matter submitted[, or]
(c) [w]here the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of the
controversy.
Id.
63. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953). Although Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/
American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989), overruled Wilko, the dictum from Wilko about
"manifest disregard" still stands and over the last 50 years the courts have built on this language. See
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933-36 (2d Cir. 1986).
The Merrill Lynch court attempted to define "manifest disregard" when it stated that it "clearly
means more than error or misunderstanding with respect to the law." Id. at 933. According to
Merrill Lynch, "[t]he error must have been obvious and capable of being readily and instantly
perceived by the average person .... " Id. Thus, in order for error to exist, an arbitrator must be
aware that the law exists and decide to ignore it. Id. This standard is therefore quite limited in its
power to reach an arbitral decision. Id. at 934.
64. See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436.
65. See Cooper, supra note 26, at 237 (challenging the assumption that arbitration is always pro-
employer and anti-employee).
66. See Clifton, supra note 27, at 416 (arguing that even after Gilmer, Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver is binding on courts considering the compulsory arbitration of Title VII claims).
B. CHARTING THE COURSE THE COURTS SHOULD TAKE IN THE
FUTURE
1. Excluding "Contracts of Employment" from FAA Coverage
a. The Gilmer Footnote
Despite Gilmer, there is still hope that Title VII claimants (and, in
fact, all employment discrimination claimants) may avoid the mandatory
enforcement of arbitration agreements. 67 This hope is based on a foot-
note in Gilmer which discusses the exclusion provided in the FAA.68 This
exclusion states that "nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 69 If this exclusion is found to
apply to Title VII, the presumption of arbitrability established by the FAA
would not apply to agreements in employment contracts that would seem
to require the arbitration of Title VII discrimination claims. The
Supreme Court, however, did not decide whether this exclusion would
apply to all "contracts of employment," stating that it would leave that
issue "for another day."-70
b. The Section One Exclusion in the Circuit Courts
Unfortunately, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal's decision in Alford
v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,71 which involved the arbitration of Title
VII claims, did not address the section one exclusion either.72 As in Gil-
mer, the arbitration clause at issue in Alford was contained in the
employee's agreement with the Securities Exchange Commission and not
with the employer directly.73 Although the Alford court did not address
67. For an overall survey of the other types of federal employment statutes whose future might
be in jeopardy after Gilmer, see G. Richard Shell, ERISA and Other Federal Employment Statutes:
When is Commercial Arbitration an "Adequate Substitute" for the Courts?, 68 TEX. L. REV. 509
(1990).
68. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647, 1651 n.2 (1991); 9 U.S.C. § 1
(1988).
69. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
70. Gilmer, Ill S. Ct. at 1651 n.2. The Court did not find the section one "contracts of
employment" exception of the FAA implicated in this case fortwo reasons. Id. First, Gilmer failed to
address the issue in the lower courts, so it was not one of the questions presented upon petition for
certiorari. Id. Second, the Court stated that the arbitration clause at issue was not even contained in
a contract of employment since the "arbitration clause at issue [was] in Gilmer's contract with the
securities ... exchanges, not with Interstate." Id. at 1651-52 n.2.
Gilmer never actually raised this issue himself, but this issue was only brought to the attention of
the Court by briefs of amici curiae. Id. at 1651 n.2. Perhaps the Court would have found that
Gilmer's contract with the securities exchange was an employment contract within the scope of the
section one exclusion if Gilmer had raised this issue instead of the amici curiae.
71. 939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991).
72. Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991).
73. Id. at 230. The employee in Alford was a stockbroker just as the employee in Gilmer. Id. at
229-30.
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the exclusion, it did warn that "[c]ounts should be mindful of this potential
issue in future cases."-
74
In Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,75 the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals was "mindful" of the FAA exclusion of "contracts of employment"
even though it did not directly affect that case.76 The Willis Court
decided that "all employment contracts with employers subject to regula-
tion under Title VII ... f[e]ll within the exclusion.., under [section] 1 of
the FAA.""7 Since this section excludes "contracts of employment of
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in for-
eign or interstate commerce,"7 8 an analysis of this statutory exception
involves the question of who "the other class of workers" are.
c. The Tenney Court Analysis
The principal decision interpreting this exclusionary language was
decided forty years ago in Tenney Engineering Inc. v. United Electrical
Radio & Machine Workers.79 In Tenney, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals interpreted the exclusionary language narrowly, finding it to
apply only to those workers directly involved in the transportation indus-
try.80 Of the seven judges that heard Tenney, four held that the "other
class of workers" language applied only to those workers who were "actu-
ally engaged in the movement of interstate or foreign commerce."81 The
chief judge of the court concurred in the opinion but wrote separately,
however, to say that this view of the exclusionary language of section one
was "too narrow to be supportable. '8 2  Similarly, the two dissenters in
Tenney stated that a "broader view of interstate commerce" was needed in
interpreting this exclusionary language."'
Although courts have followed Tenney for forty years, its analysis
seems flawed. First, the Tenney court virtually ignored section two of the
74. Id. at 230.
75. 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991).
76. Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F. 2d 305, 310-12 (6th Cir. 1991) The Willis court
found it necessary to discuss this exception because Willis and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission had argued that the agreement Willis signed in her registration application was an
employment contract and therefore was within the FAA "contract of employment" exception. Id. at
310.
77. Id. at 311.
78. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988) (emphasis added).
79. 207 F. 2d 450, 453 (3d Cir. 1953).
80. Tenney Eng'g Inc. v. United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers, 207 F. 2d 450, 453 (3d Cir.
1953).
81. Id. at 452. The Tenney court stated that it applied the rule of ejusdem generis in coming to
the conclusion that "the other class of workers" referred only to those workers who were "actually
engaged in the movement of interstate or foreign commerce." Id.
82. Id. at 454-55 (Biggs, C.J., concurring) (arguing that the "face of the statute" should control).
83. Id. at 459 (McLaughlin, J., dissenting). The Tenney dissenters stated that Congress could
have easily worded the FAA to exclude only "transportation workers" if they had wanted to. Id. at
458.
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FAA. 4 Section two is important because it contains the affirmative cover-
age of the statute, providing that it will apply to contracts "evidencing a
transaction involving commerce. ' s  Furthermore, it would create a para-
dox to interpret "engaged in commerce," which comes from the exclu-
sionary portion of the FAA, more narrowly than the "involving commerce"
language that is contained in section two of the FAA.8 6 This is because
"those employment contracts most involving interstate commerce . . .
would fall outside the Act's [FAA] coverage [and] those with less direct
connection to interstate commerce.., would fall within the Act's affirma-
tive coverage and would not be exempt." 7 It is hard to believe Congress
intended this paradoxical result when it drafted the FAA, because it
would have the effect of excluding transportation industries, which were,
by their nature, heavily involved with interstate commerce and which
were also the most likely to have signed arbitration agreements. 8 Fur-
thermore, it is unlikely that the different wording of both sections,
"involving commerce" as opposed to "engaged in commerce," arose out of
anything other than grammatical necessity.
89
The Tenney court based its narrow interpretation of the exclusionary
language, "engaged in commerce," largely on the rule of ejusdem
generis. ° Under this rule, the Tenney court concluded that since the two
specific contract exemptions named, seamen and railroad employees,
were directly involved in the movement of interstate or foreign com-
merce, such must be the case with "the other class of workers."9 ' By
construing this exclusionary language in this limited manner, however, an
anomaly develops: by merely excluding workers involved in the transpor-
tation industry, Congress would have excluded the only class of employ-
ees at that time who were likely to have signed agreements to arbitrate
employment disputes and would have applied the law to other workers
84. See id. at 454 n.15 (saying that since the arbitration agreement in dispute was valid under
state law, reference to section two was unnecessary).
85. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
86. Brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 14, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20
(1991) (No. 90-18) [hereinafter Amicus Brief] (arguing that a paradox would result if section one's
languae was interpreted more narrowly than section two).8. Id.
88. Id. at 15.
89. Id. at 13. The writers of the Amicus Brief argued that it would have been incorrect for
Congress to have stated that the transaction was "engaged" in commerce or to have referred to "a
class of workers involving commerce." Id.
90. This term is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as "[o]f the same kind, class, or nature."
BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 517 (6th ed. 1990). Black's further provides that in constructing laws, this
rule states that "where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a
pr cular... meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to
be held as applying only to persons or things of the same general kind . .. as those specifically
mentioned." Id.
91. Tenney Eng'g Inc. v. United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers, 207 F.2d 450, 452 (3rd Cir.
1953).
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who probably had no dealings with arbitration contracts.9" It would be
strange if Congress had enacted a law that encouraged commercial arbi-
tration yet excluded from its coverage those industries that utilized arbi-
tration at that time. Furthermore, as the dissent in Tenney noted, "if
transportation workers alone were to have been excluded Congress could
have used more appropriate language to indicate such intention."93 Thus,
it seems that the "other class of workers" language should be interpreted
more broadly than in Tenney and should be found to apply to all employ-
ment contracts.
d. The Legislative History of the FAA
It is also important to look at the legislative history of the FAA when
interpreting this exclusionary language. This legislative history indicates
that Congress's intent when enacting the FAA was to exclude all employ-
ment contracts from the Act's coverage.9 The first hint of its intent
comes from the title of the original bill. The bill was titled, "Sales and
Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal Com-
mercial Arbitration."95 Furthermore, as the hearings on this bill show,
Congress's intent was that this bill apply purely to commercial disputes,
with its aim being at the merchant.' During the hearings, supporter of
the bill, Mr. Bernheimer, Chairman of the Arbitration Committees of the
New York Chamber of Commerce, stated that "[tlhe merchant is by
instinct averse to... any formality... [b]ut the merchant finds that arbi-
tration is a very direct and expeditious method" of resolving disputes.9"
Mr. Bernheimer also claimed that this statute would help reduce the
price of goods for the consumer because the merchant will add costs in
figuring prices based on the risk of rejection and litigation.98 Similarly,
Mr. Piatt, the Chairman of the American Bar Association's Committee of
Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law, said the bill would offer an
opportunity for saving perishable products, such as a carload of potatoes,
92. See Amicus Brief, supra note 86, at 15.
93. Tenney, 207 F.2d at 458 (McLaughlin, J., dissenting).
94. Contra Tenney, 207 F.2d at 452 (saying that "[tihe legislative history furnishes little light" on
the intent of Congress in creating the section one exclusion).
95. Sales and Arbitration: Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the Judiciary on S. 4213 and 4214,
67th Cong., 4th Sess. (1923) [hereinafter Hearing].
96. Id. at 3-7 (statement of Charles L. Bernheimer, Chairman of the Arbitration Committee of
the New York Chamber of Commerce).
97. Id. at 5. Mr. Bernheimer recognized that arbitration was a "time-honored method" for
dealing with business disputes. Id. at 3 (emphasis added). By "business," it is clear that Mr.
Bernheimer was referring to disputes between merchants and consumers, for he states the bill will
help "establish and maintain business amity and . . . reduce the price of commodities to the
consumer." Id.
98. id.
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by moving quickly in arbitration rather than waiting to litigate.99 Thus, it
seems that the bill's intent was to influence merchant relationships, not
employment relationships.
Further evidence of this intention to exclude employment relation-
ships is found in the objection of Mr. Furuseth, president of the Seamen's
Union, which was discussed at the hearing. °° Mr. Furuseth objected to
the bill in fear that it would "compel arbitration of the matters of agree-
ment between the stevedores and their employers."'1 1 To this, Mr. Piatt
answered:
It was not the intention of this bill to make an industrial arbitra-
tion in any sense .... It is not intended that this shall be an act
referring to labor disputes at all. It is purely an act to give the
merchants the right or the privilege of sitting down and agreeing
with each other as to what their damages are, if they want to do
it. Now, that is all there is in this.1
0 2
Herbert Hoover, Secretary of Commerce, also addressed these fears, stat-
ing that if "objection appears to the inclusion of workers' contracts[,] ... it
might well be amended by stating 'but nothing herein contained shall
apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any
other class of workers engaged in interstate or foreign commerce."1O3
Mr. Hoover proposed this language (the same language that exists in sec-
tion one today) because he feared that without this language, workers'
contracts in general, and not just specific contracts, would be included
within FAA coverage' °4
Arguably, the amendment specifically referred to seamen because of
Mr. Furuseth's objection at the hearing and similarly, inclusion of railroad
workers was likely a result of their role as the major transporters of goods
at that time.'0 The Tenney court may have been mistaken when it said
that the legislative history did not shed light on Congress's intent in creat-
ing this exclusion. Thus, it seems that its analysis is flawed and should not
be relied upon as accurate authority for this issue.
99. Id. at 11. Mr. Bernheimer also noted that legally binding arbitration would "help to
conserve perishable and semiperishable food products," saving millions of dollars in food
expenditures. Id. at 3.
100. See Hearing, supra note 95, at 9.
101. Id.
102. Id. (emphasis added).
103. Id. at 14.
104. Id.
105. See Tenney Eng'g v. United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers, 207 F.2d 450, 452 (1953)
(discussing the objections that Mr. Furuseth had to the Act on behalf of the Seamen's Union).
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e. The Willis Court's Broad Interpretation
Apparently, the court in Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.'6 was
therefore correct to broadly interpret the FAA's exclusion and to look to
the legislative history in doing so. 10 7 The Willis court found that the legis-
lative history of the FAA showed "that the FAA was never meant to incor-
porate employment contracts with the requisite effects on interstate
commerce within its scope."' 08 It stated that such "requisite effects" refer
to the contracts of employment of workers engaged in interstate com-
merce.'" All of the employment contracts at stake in Title VII suits have
this "requisite" effect on interstate commerce, for as Willis noted, Con-
gress enacted Title VII within its power to regulate commerce." 0 The
Willis court thus concluded that "all employment contracts with employ-
ers [which are] subject to regulation under Title VII . . . fall within the
exclusion of 'contracts of employment' under § 1 of the FAA.""'
2. Why the Courts Should find Employment Contracts to be
Excluded from FAA Coverage
The continued survival and growth of Title VII, and all other similar
statutes, such as the ADEA, which protect against employment discrimi-
nation, depend on the exclusion of employment contracts from the FAA's
coverage." 2 There are many reasons why this conclusion is mandated, a
number of which the Gilmer Court summarily and most unsatisfactorily
dismissed." 3
106. 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991).
107. Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 948 F.2d 305, 311 (6th Cir. 1991).
108. Id.
109. Id. (referrin to section one of the FAA).
110. Id. The deinition of the term "employer" under Tide VII is "a person engaged in an
industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of
twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year...." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)
(1988) (emphasis added). Congress also defined the term "industry affecting commerce" as -any
activity, business, or industry in commerce or in which a labor dispute would hinder or obstruct
commerce or the free flow of commerce." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(h) (1988).
Almost every employer would be involved in interstate commerce for purposes of coming within
the coverage of Title VII, for Title VII defines evidence of interstate commerce as "communication
among the several States ...or between points in the same State but through a point outside
thereof." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(g) (1988). Seemingly, the only thing needed to implicate "commerce" is
a long distance phone bill, which most every place of employment has. See, e.g., Equal Employment
Opp. Comm'n v. Rinella & Rinella, 401 F. Supp. 175, 182 (ND. Ill. 1975) (holding, on the basis of its
long distance phone bill and ownership of reference books that were published out of state, that a law
firm practicing predominantly in a localized area was a business-engaged in industry affecting
commerce for purposes of Title VII).111. Willis, 948 F.2d at 311. The employment contracts of any employer who is subject to the
ADEA similarly fall within the exclusion-bec~ause the ADEA was also enacted under Congress's
commerce power. See 29 U.S.C. § 630(b)(g)(h) (1988).112. See infra notes 114-138 and accompanying text.
113. See Gilmer, 1115. Ct. at 16,54-56 (dsmissing, with brevity, many of Gilmer's concerns with
the arbitration of Tie VII claims, such as the limited bsovery allowed in arbitration and the private
nature of arbitration proceedings). The Garner Court's fact-specific analysis, used to make such quick
dismissals of Gilmer's arguments, seriously limits the precedential value of Gilmer.
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First, the Court quickly dismissed Gilmer's concern with the limited
discovery available in arbitration hearings. a Discovery, however, plays
an important role in building proof of employment discrimination." 15
One commentator has suggested that because of the difficulty in proving
employment discrimination, "access to information in the employer's con-
trol may be essential to a plaintiffs case.""' Even one commentator call-
ing for the elimination of discovery recognized that discovery should be
retained in a few instances, naming employment discrimination as one
such instance.
17
In Gilmer, the Court stated that age discrimination claims probably
do not require more extensive discovery than other claims, such as RICO
and antitrust claims, which the Court previously found to be arbitrable.""
The Gilmer Court failed to recognize, however, that discovery in employ-
ment discrimination claims often involves extensive inquiries into the
work environment of the employer." 9 One court has noted that the
114. Id. at 1654-55 (stating that there was no showing that the New York Stock Exchange
discovery provisions were insufficient so as to prevent Gilmer from having a fair arbitration hearing).
115. See Coopr, supra note 26, at 218 (stating that it would be "particularly problematic" to
determine an employment discrimination case without complete discovery). Proving the existence of
"hostile environment" sexual harassment can be quite problematic. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57, 68 (1986). Hostile environment sexualharassment is harassment that, "while not affecting
economic benefits, creates a hostile or offensive working environment." Id. at 62. To even state a
claim of hostile environment sexual harassment, the evidence of the alleged conduct must be
"sufficiently severe or pervasive" so as to alter the victim's conditions of employment and create a
working environment that is abusive. Id. at 67. Furthermore, the complainant must show that the
sex-related conduct engaged in by the complainant was "unwelcome." Id. at 68.
The Court in Mentor recognized that determining whether the conduct was unwelcome
"presents difficult problems of proof.-" Id. The trier of fact is required to look at "the record as a
whole" and "the totality of circumstances." Id. at 69 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1985)). To
obtain this type of proof, Title VII claimants often need the extensive discovery that litigation affords.
116. Susan Elizabeth Powley, Exploring the Second Level of Parity: Suggestionsfor Developing
an Analytical Framework for Forum Selection in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 44 VAND. L.
REV. 641, 683 (1991). Powley further stated that in a disparate impact discrimination case, discovery
is especially important because the statistical data which plaintiffs need to prove their case can only be
found in the employer's records. Id.
117. Loren Kieve, Discovery Reform, 77 A.B.A. J. 79, 81 (Dec. 1991). This exception is needed
because plaintiffs in employment discrimination suits "[need] to have access to employer's statistical
employment information." Id. See also lnfra note 119 (discussing disparate impact cases in more
detail).
118. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647, 1654 (1991). The Court failed to
explain just why it thought that ADEA claims did not require any more discovery than RICO or
antitrust claims. Id.
119. An example of such highly sensitive workplace discovery occurs under the law of "disparate
impact" discrimination as developed by Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). This type of
discrimination is not easily recognizable since the discrimination is not purposeful. Id. at 431. An
intent to discriminate by the employer is not needed because, in finding discrimination, the court
must look to the "consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation." Id. at 432. In
Griggs, two aptitude tests were at issue. Id. at 427-28. Duke Power Company began requiring that
their employees pass the two tests and have a high school education in order to transfer out of the
labor department, one of the company's least desirable positions. Id. This policy effectively
disqualified people of color at a significantly higher rate than whites. Id. at 426. In order to prove
this disqualifying effect, undoubtedly the plaintiff needed to obtain statistics, which would have
required extensive discovery into Duke's records.
If this same scenario had been submitted to an arbitral forum, it probably would have made a
quick finding of "no discrimination" because the arbitrators would only be looking for evidence that
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weapon of discovery is a "critical means of securing justice when informa-
tion is exclusively in the hands of the adversary," which is often the case in
employment discrimination cases.' 20  Because adequate discovery is
essential to Title VII plaintiffs' cases, courts must assure these plaintiffs
that they will be allowed its use in proving their cases. Thus, arbitration
agreements in employment contracts should not be enforceable and dis-
crimination claimants should be allowed their day in court.
The Court in Gilmer dealt with this discovery problem by stating that
there was no showing that the discovery allowed under the New York
Stock Exchange [hereinafter NYSE] discovery provisions was inade-
quate. 121 While it may well be that the NYSE discovery provisions did
not disadvantage Gilmer, the next challenger of an arbitration agreement
may not be so fortunate. The Supreme Court has created a situation in
which they will have to determine the adequacy of the specific discovery
practices governing each arbitration agreement. Such a practice will
detract from the speed with which arbitration proceedings are
credited.'1 2 However, failing to look at the discovery allowed under every
arbitration agreement simply because the Court found one arbitration
system to be adequate would be unfair to future employment discrimina-
tion claimants for they might not be dealing with an arbitration system
that allows for adequate discovery.
Another reason employment discrimination claimants must be
allowed to pursue their claims in court is that arbitration proceedings are
the employer was motivated by racial considerations. Richard F. Richards, Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver: A Threat to Title VII Rights, 29 ARK. L. REv. 129, 132 (1975). In such a situation, there
often is no evidence that the employer's motive was to discriminate, and unfortunately, an arbitrator
frequently will merely make a factual determination that an employee's race or sex did not influence a
decision. Id. This, however, is not the same as looking for an employer's alleged unlawful
discrimination under Title VII because in a Title VII dis parate impact case, the intention of the
employer does not matter. Id. See also Alexander v. Cardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 42 (1974)
(stating that the arbitrator's ruling that the Title VII claimant had been "discharged for just cause" did
not amount to a finding that no racial discrimination had taken place).
To defend a disparate impact claim, an employer has the burden of proof and must show that the
given requirement has a "manifest relationship to the employment in question." Griggs, 401 U.S. at
432. This test is called the "business necessity" defense and was added to Title VII in 1991. Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074 (1992) (amending Tide VII).
Duke Power was unable to carry this burden because the evidence before the Court showed that
before the policy was instituted, the employees who had not taken the tests or finished high school
did well and advanced. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. One can see the importance of extensive discovery
here for it allowed the plaintiff to discover this type of statistical information.
120. Montalvo v. Hutchinson, No. 90 Civ. 0299, 1993 WL 483039, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22,
1993). Montalvo involved a police misconduct case. Id. However, employment discrimination cases
and actions against the police have been grouped together as types of claims in which "the full
panoply of discovery" is needed. Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Models and Trial Outcomes in Civil
Rights and Prisoner Cases, 77 GEO. L. J. 1567, 1581 (1989).
121. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct 1647, 1654 (1991).
122. Dwight Golann, Making Alternative Dispute Resolution Mandatory: The Constitutional
Issues, 68 OR. L. REV. 487, 488 (1989).
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usually private proceedings."l 3 This is another advantage that arbitration
has over litigation.124 When civil rights are at issue, however, private pro-
ceedings can prove to be a disadvantage for many reasons which even the
Court in Gilmer recognized." z First, it can be a disadvantage if the
employer's discriminatory policies are kept from public knowledge.
126
Second, private proceedings make it quite difficult to obtain adequate
review of an arbitrator's decision.' 27 Finally, without regularly reported
decisions upon which to build, the danger exists that the law of employ-
ment discrimination will stagnate. 128 Because most court decisions are
reported, litigating employment discrimination claims eliminates the dan-
ger of stagnation in this area of the law. Reported decisions enable a body
of law to develop upon which future Title VII claimants can depend.
The Gilmer Court should have addressed Gilmer's concern with the
privacy of the arbitral forum more broadly, for in the future, any purely
"private" arbitral decision could be challenged using the privacy rationale
that Gilmer employed.'2 9 As if to reassure themselves, the Gilmer Court
commented that "ADEA claims will continue to be issued because it is
unlikely that all or even most ADEA claimants will be subject to arbitra-
tion agreements." 130 This may not be true in the future if the Court were
to decide that all employment contracts were subject to the FAA. Should
123. ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 2, at 242. The Gilmer Court once again summarily
dismissed this argument. Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1655. The Supreme Court stated that these concerns
were not a problem in Gilmer because the New York Stock Exchange [NYSE] rules required that all
arbitration awards be in writing. Id. at 1655. They also noted that the public is allowed to view the
award decisions under the NYSE system. Id. But see Cooper, supra note 26, at 214 (arguing that the
NYSE arbitration program is essentially private since the award is not published and a person who
seeks information on an arbitration proceeding must travel to the NYSE office and request to see the
award form).
Even if the NYSE system was to result in easy public access to arbitration decisions, this is not
the norm. STEPHEN P. DOYLE & ROGER S. HAYDOCK, WITHOUT THE PUNCHES: RESOLVING
DIsPUTEs WITHOUT LITIGATION 20 (1991). Arbitration hearings normally are only attended by
parties and witnesses to the action, and the arbitration decisions are kept confidential unless the
parties otherwise agree. Id.
124. DOYLE & HAYDOCK, supra note 123, at 21.
125. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647, 1655 (1991) (noting the dangers
that can result from the privacy of arbitral proceedings).
126. See Shell, supra note 39, at 568 (stating that the adjudication of a Title VII claim gives the
public an opportunity to examine the institutions which engaged in the discrimination).
127. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text (discussing the grounds for review of arbitral
decisions).
128. In a discussion of the extension of ADR to constitutional and public law issues, Justice
Edwards, circuit judge for the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, warned
that "[in our rush to embrace alternatives to litigation, we must be careful not to endanger what law
has accomplished or to destroy this important function of formal adjudication." Harry T. Edwards,
Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARv. L. REV. 668, 676 (1986). The
important function to which Justice Edwards referred was the ensuring of the proper application of
public values. Id.
129. In fact, any future litigant who was involved in any type of arbitration other than that
governed by the NYSE could once again raise the exact same concerns that Gilmer did.
130. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647, 1655 (1991).
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that happen, it would undoubtedly become standard practice to insert
arbitration agreements into most employment contracts. 131
Another reason that the courts should not be traded for arbitral
forums is that the danger arises that those with greater bargaining power
will take advantage of those with little or no bargaining power.'1 2 Unfor-
tunately, most employees who are offered arbitration agreements have no
bargaining power.'-a Often, employees are offered mandatory arbitration
provisions on a "take-it-or-leave-it basis."' 34 Employees are required to
agree to the arbitration provision "as a term and condition of their
employment." l- Employees may either be denied a benefit related to
the employment or denied employment altogether if they do not agree to
the provisions.13 6
The courts should be wary of forcing an employee with less bargain-
ing power than their employer to arbitrate instead of litigate issues of
discrimination. Of course, the Supreme Court noted in Gilmer that
"[m]ere inequality in bargaining power.., is not a sufficient reason to
hold that arbitration agreements are never enforceable in the employ-
ment context." 37 The Court did, however, comment that the relative
bargaining power of the contracting parties must be considered in every
attempt to enforce an arbitration agreement, saying that the "claim of
unequal bargaining power is best left for resolution in specific cases."138
Once again, the Court has left open an issue that courts must decide anew
every time it is raised. Since the Gilmer Court left so many questions
131. In this way, employers would free themselves of the "hassle" and expense of litigation.
Employers might then believe they could "afford" to look the other way in the face of discriminatory
practices or policies in their workplace.
132. This concern is not a new one because it was addressed by Senator Walsh during the FAA
hearing in 1923. Hearing, supra note 95, at 9. In voicing his concerns on this matter Senator Walsh
stated that
[t]he trouble about the matter is that a great many of these contracts that are entered into
are really not voluntarily things at all. Take an insurance policy: there is a blank in it.
You can take that or you can leave it. The agent has no power at all to decide it. Either
you can make that contract or you can not make any contract. It is the same with a good
many contracts of employment. A man says "These are our terms. All right, take it or
leave it." Well, there is nothing for the man to do except to sign it; and then he
surrenders his right to have his case tried by the court.
Id. (emphasis added).
133. Ralph H. Baxter, Jr. & Evelyn M. Hunt, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Arbitration of
Employment Claims, 15 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 187, 191 (1989) (stating that most employees are
required to agree to arbitration provisions as "a term an condition of their employment").
134. Id. Contracts offered on a "take-it-or leave-it basis" are contracts of adhesion. Id.
Furthermore, employees seeking to avoid aribtrating a dispute "may assert that the arbitration
agreement is a contract of adhesion." Id.
135. Id. The authors of this article state that "[riarely, if ever, will individual employees be
permitted to negotiate a change in the arbitration provisions that are offered." Id.
136. Id.
137. Cilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647, 1655 (1991).
138. Id. at 1656.
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unanswered, the arbitration option is likely to be as time-consuming as
litigation.
3. Distinguishing Title VII from the ADEA
There is still one final way that Title VII claimants may be able to
avoid a arbitral forum, even though ADEA claimants in a similar situation
have been told they must arbitrate. This "last straw" argument rests on
the hope that the Supreme Court will not apply Gilmer to Title VII
claims. Courts after Gilmer have enforced agreements to arbitrate when
Title VII claims were at stake.' 39 However, Title VII claimants may still
be able to get their claim heard in a judicial forum if Title VII is distin-
guished from the ADEA, based on the standard set forth in Shearsoni
American Express, Inc. v. McMahon. 4 0 Title VII and the ADEA must be
distinguished because the Gilmer Court applied the FAA to the ADEA. 14 1
In McMahon, the Supreme Court set out the standard for determining
whether the FAA was applicable to a particular statute. a1 4  This standard
involves looking at the "text, history, or purposes" of a statute.'43 Deter-
mining this applicability is important because if the FAA is found to be
applicable to a statute, it establishes a presumption favoring the arbitra-
tion of statutory claims.'4 Distinguishing Title VII from the ADEA
under the McMahon standard will involve a search for ways that the "text,
history, or purposes" of Title VII differ from those of the ADEA.45
139. Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991) (requiring plaintiff to
arbitrate her Title VII claims because of an arbitration agreement signed in a securities registration
application); Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991) (reversing an earlier
decision to allow a Title VII claimant to bypass arbitration). The Supreme Court seems to suggest
that enforcing agreements to arbitrate these- Title VII claims was the appropriate course for the
circuits to take. See Alford, 111 S. Ct. at 2050 (vacating the fifth circuit's decision not to enforce the
commercial arbitration of the plaitiffs Title VII claim in light of Gilmer).
140. 482 U.S. 221 (1987). In McMahon, Shearson/American Express moved to compel the
consumer plaintiffs to arbitrate claims against them, based on the arbitration provisions contained in
the customer agreements they had signed. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S.
221, 223 (1987). The claims brought against the defendants in this action arose under RICO and the
Exchange Act. Id. To defeat this motion to compel arbitration, the Supreme Court stated that the
plaintiffs would have to show that the FAA did not apply to the Exchange Act and RICO. Id. at 227.
This is where the McMahon standard comes from.
141. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647, 1651 (1991). Gilmer created a
presumption favoring the arbitration of ADEA claims, but only when "contracts of employment" are
not at stake. In Gilmer, the Court applied the FAA to the ADEA without even mentioning the
McMahon standard. Id. at 1651-52. It will be interesting to note whether the Supreme Court will
allow such an omission when a similar suit arises in a Title VII context, because in doing so, it would
again be disregarding direct authority, being the McMahon standard.
142. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987). The Court in
McMahon stated that in order for parties to demonstrate that Congress intended to exempt a statute
from FAA coverage, they must show that Congress's intention is "discernible from the text, history, or
purposes of the statute." Id.
143. Id.
144. See id. at 226 (discussing the policy of the FAA favoring arbitration).
145. See id. at 227 (determining the applicability of the FAA to a given statute based on the
"text, history, or purposes" of the statute). Title VII's "text, history, or purposes" must be
distinguished from the ADEA because in Gilmer, the Supreme Court has found tat the text, history,
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:435
The task of separating Title VII from the ADEA is not easy because
the ADEA is largely derived from Title VII.' 46 Yet, since the two statutes
are not exactly the same, an analysis of one should not be interposed on
the other.147 First of all, under the McMahon standard, a court must con-
sider the text of the statute when determining the applicability of the
FAA.141 One key difference in the text of Title VII and the ADEA is that
the ADEA expressly provides for a waiver of a judicial forum 149 while
Title VII does not,' indicating that Congress intends that Title VII
claims be heard by a court. Even though this waiver provision is very
limited, 15 1 the lack of a similar provision in Title VII might imply that
Congress did not intend for such important statutory rights to be waived.
A key procedural difference exists between the two statutes. That is,
an action commenced under the ADEA supersedes any pending state
action.'15  However, this is not the case under Title VII. Under Title VII,
similar actions commenced under state law are expressly preserved by
Congress when a Title VII action is commenced.' 53  This allocation of
concurrent jurisdiction may emphasize the vital role played by statutes
designed to eradicate the types of discrimination at which Title VII is
aimed.' 54 This preservation broadens the equal employment opportuni-
ties for plaintiffs155 by leaving open an additional judicial forum in which
their rights might be vindicated.
and purposes of the ADEA do not preclude a finding that the FAA is applicable to the ADEA.
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647, 1652-57 (1991).
146. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978) (stating that "the prohibitions of the ADEA
were derived in haec verba from Title VII").
147. Even the counsel for Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation believed that an analysis of the
ADEA should not be adopted for Title VII, saying that "McMahon requires that a court separately
analyze the text . . . of each statute in dispute." Respondent's Brief in Opposition to a Writ of
Certiorari at 12, Gilmer, (No. 90-18) (alteration in original). Interstate's counsel went on to argue
that since Title VII had never been in dispute in this litigation, the "circuit court decisions which
involved Title VII claims do not present a true conflict with the statutory analysis of the ADEA
presented here." Id. at 12-13 (citations omitted). In the same manner, the circuit courts should not
e required to follow Gilmer's rationale when Title VII claims are at issue since they require a
separate analysis.
148. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987).
149. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f) (Supp. III 1991). The ADEA provides that in order for a judicial waiver
to be valid it must be "knowing and voluntary." Id. at § 626(0(1). The ADEA strictly governs the
considerations to be given in determining what constitutes a "knowing and voluntary" waiver by
specifying it in the statute. See id. at § 626(f)(1)(A)-(H).
150. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988) (omitting a waiver of a judicial forum).
151. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(0 (Supp. III 1991) (limiting the waiver to only those cases where it is
knowing and voluntary).
152. 29 U.S.C. § 633(a) (1988). Section 633 states that "upon commencement of action under
[the ADEA] such action shall supersede any State action." Id.
153. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1988). This section, titled "Effect on State Laws," states that
"[n]othing in [Title VII] shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any person from any liability
provided by any... law of State or any political subdivision of a State .... " Id.
154. Title VII seeks to eliminate discrimination based on "race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
155. See Cooper, supra note 26, at 225-26. Cooper further argued that:
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Furthermore, these two statutes have different purposes. 16 While
one of the purposes of Title VII is to actively "remove barriers that have
operated in the past to favor an identifiable group," 5 7 the main purpose
of the ADEA is to "promote employment of older persons" in the
future.'58  In other words, the aim of Title VII is both retroactive and
proactive, 15 9 whereas the aim of the ADEA is mainly proactive in
nature. '6 In order to make sure that the retroactive goal of Title VII is
furthered, the courts should ensure the future litigation of Title VII dis-
putes. Future litigation is needed to ensure the retroactive goal of Title
VII because discovery works to unveil the vestiges of past discrimination.
However, discovery is limited in arbitration. 16 ' Thus, allowing Title VII
plaintiffs to discover past evidence of discriminatory practices by their
employers is necessary because the retroactive purposes of Title VII have
yet to be fulfilled.'1 2
Consideration should also be given to the fact that "age" as a classifi-
cation is notably different from those classifications, such as race and gen-
der, which Title VII protects. The Supreme Court has recognized that
"old age does not define a 'discrete and insular' group" but rather "marks
[t]he congressional intent of Title VII to preserve rights and procedures under state
antidiscrimination statutes suggests that such rights could not be subject to waiver of a
judicial forum, notwithstanding the FAA. Because the congressional intent is to preclude
waiver of state antidiscrimination rights and procedures, there can be no compulsory
arbitration under FAA of rights protected by state antidiscrimination laws. Further, since
Title VII actions can be brought in either state or federal court, full preservation of state
rights would require that the Title VII action as well as its state counterpart not be waived
by arbitration. Therefore, a claimant could sue under Title VII in court notwithstanding
the FAA.
Id. at 226. (citations omitted).
156. See infra notes 157-160 and accompanying text (discussing the difference in purpose).
157. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971). Another purpose of Title VII is to
"achieve equality of employment opportunities" for its protected classes. Id. at 429. For a discussion
of Griggs, see supra note 119.
158. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1988).
159. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-30. The Supreme Court stated in Griggs that "[tihe objective of
Congres in te enactment of Title VII .. .was to achieve equality of employment opportunities
(proactive) and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of...
employees over other employees (retroactive)." Id.
160. The ADEA's express purpose is "to promote employment of older persons based on their
ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; to help employers and
workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employment." 29 U.S.C.§621(b) (1988).
161. See Shell, supra note 39, at 534 (writing that in commercial and labor arbitration,
"discovery is limited"). This is one reason that the arbitral process is oftentimes more expeditious
than going to trial. ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 2, at 9 (stating that compared to litigation,
arbitration is relatively quick); for more on the importance of discovery, see supra notes 115-120 and
accompanying text.
162. One example that Title VII's retroactive purposes have yet to be fulfilled is the
overwhelming evidence that women are still "concentrated in low-paying, low-status jobs," and
women with college degrees often earn less than males with only high school diplomas. Heather K.
Gerken, Understanding Mixed Motives Claims Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991: An Analysis of
Intentional Discrimination Claims Based on Sex-Stereotyped Interview Questions, 91 MICH. L. REV.
1824, 1825 (1993). There is also much evidence that women are less likely than men to obtain
advancements in professional levels and pay. Id.
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a stage that each of us will reach if we live out our normal span."' 63 Thus,
the Supreme Court has recognized that the classification protected by the
ADEA, the aged, does not constitute a discrete and insular class. How-
ever, this is not the case with classifications protected by Title VII. These
classifications do describe discrete and insular groups since they are based
on distinctions a person has at birth and is not likely to change. Perhaps
in the arbitral forum, ADEA claimants require less protection than Title
VII claimants since age is a status everyone will someday attain and there-
fore, arbitrators would be conscious of protecting those parties discrimi-
nated against on the basis of their age. Further, since ADEA claimants
have generally not been subject to a "history of purposeful unequal treat-
ment" as have those claimants under Title VII, perhaps the aged are not
as in need of such strong protections as are those who have suffered dis-
crimination on the basis of race or gender. 164 On the basis of this differ-
ential treatment of the classifications protected by Title VII and the age
classification protected by the ADEA, the Supreme Court could decide
against extending Gilmer to Title VII claims.
III. CONCLUSION
The arbitration of Title VII claims can benefit all parties involved,
but only when the parties voluntarily decide to arbitrate after the
employer's disputed behavior has already occurred.165 This ideal situa-
tion, however, is not the norm in arbitration agreements that are written
into employment contracts. These largely nonnegotiable contracts are
163. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1975) (quoting United
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53, n.4 (1938)). At issue in Murgia was a
Massachusetts law requiring police officers to retire at the age of 50. Id. at 308. Robert Murgia, a
Massachusetts police officer, argued that this law denied him his right to equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 308-309.
164. Id. at 313. For the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection analysis, the
Court in Murgia held that a classification based on age would be subject to only the lowest level of
scrutiny, rational-basis scrutiny. Id. at 314. Under the rational-basis scrutiny, a classification will be
upheld if it is "rationally related to the State's objective." Id. at 315. Classifications based on race,
however, are automatically suspect and are therefore subject to the "most rigid scrutiny." Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). The Court in Murgia noted that because of the history of
purposeful discriminatory treatment towards suspect classes, they require this extra protection from
"the majoritarian political process." 427 U.S. at 313.
While classifications based on gender have never been held to be suspect, the Supreme Court
has recognized that this classification deserves to be examined with heightened scrutiny. Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). In order to withstand judicial scrutiny, the gender-based
classification must serve a "legitimate and important" state objective. Mississippi Univ. for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982). Not only must there be an important governmental objective, but
there must also be a "direct" and "substantial" relationship between this objective and the means
chosen to achieve this objective. Id. United States Supreme Court Justice Ginsburg has raised the
issue that a classification based on gender may be subject to strict scrutiny by stating in a footnote that
"it remains an open question whether 'classifications based upon gender are inherently suspect."
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 373 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 n.9 (1982)).
165. See infra note 167 and accompanying text.
often offered on a "take it or leave it" basis and therefore do not qualify as
being voluntary. 6 For these reasons, courts should proceed cautiously
when deciding whether or not to enforce arbitration agreements when
claims of employment discrimination are at stake.
To be a true "alternative" for both employees and employers, arbitra-
tion must be voluntarily entered into after the dispute has materialized.
This voluntary, dispute-oriented arbitration was what Congress endorsed
when enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which encouraged courts to
authorize parties to engage in ADR techniques "where appropriate."" 7
Courts faced with employment discrimination claims should give heed to
this statement and give careful thought to whether the enforcement of a
given arbitration agreement is wise. When the courts are asked to extend
Gilmer's rationale to include employment contracts, they should decide
this in the negative.
Heidi M. Hellekson
166. See Hearing, supra note 95, at 9.
167. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 118, 105 Stat. 1071, 1081 (1991). The
House Democrats' intent in expressly authorizing the use of ADR for resolving employment
discrimination claims was that the proviso be used "to supplement, not supplant, remedies provided
by Title VII, and [was] not to be used to preclude rigits and remedies that would otherwise be
available." 137 CONG. REC. H9530 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991). The House Democrats also stated that
section 118 was intended to be consistent with Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974),
which emphasized the importance of allowing the courts to hear Title VII claims, even in the face of
an arbitration agreement. Id. Furthermore, the House Democrats specifically stated that no
approval of the Gilmer decision was intended. Id. They concluded by stating that section 118
contemplated "the use of voluntary arbitration to resolve specific disputes after they had arisen, not
coercive attempts to force employees in advance to forego statutory rights.- Id. (emphasis added).
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